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Abstract 
In his assessment of Paul Tillich’s theology, Dirk Martin Grube states that revelation pertains to knowledge 
about knowledge instead of knowledge about the world. This concept of revelation raises two interrelated 
questions: 1) Can revelation be restricted to an epistemological metalevel without conveying propositional 
content?; 2) Does knowledge based on revelation potentially conflict with other forms of knowledge? This 
article denies the first and affirms the latter, thus arguing against Grube’s thesis and uses the importance of 
the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as a litmus test. 
Keywords: Paul Tillich, Dirk-Martin Grube, revelation, faith and science, propositional truth, historicity of the 
resurrection 
The question how the Christian confession relates to knowledge in general does not only pertain 
to abstract epistemological issues, but is relevant for the relationship between faith and science 
and for the unity of truth. Revelation – or the belief in revelation – influences one’s perspective 
on reality. 
Dirk-Martin Grube’s book on Paul Tillich, Offenbarung, absolute Wahrheit und 
interreligiöser Dialog, unlocks the complicated structures underlying Tillich’s thoughts on 
revelation and truth.1 It offers clear insights  
1 D.-M. Grube, Offenbarung, absolute Wahrheit und interreligiöser Dialog. Studien zur Theologie Paul Tillichs 
(Tillich Research 14), Berlin/Boston 2019, 124-156. I want thank my colleague for his short reply to my response to 
his book at the conference ‘Paul Tillich on Religion and Culture’ held in Amsterdam, 4th of October 2019, and for his 
helpful reflections on the first draft of this article. 
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into the work of this German-American theologian, and particularly into his concept of 
revelation; it is a treasure trove, a Fundgrube. Nevertheless, the publication also evokes some 
fundamental theological questions. 
Grube argues that for Tillich the knowledge of revelation is knowledge about knowledge 
instead of knowledge about the world and he expresses his agreement with him on this point.2 
Few theologians will object against the statement that revelation also includes knowledge about 
knowledge, but the claim made by Grube’s ‘instead of’ is stronger and more exclusive. It implies 
that revelation does not convey new information about the world.3 This has far-reaching 
implications for the character of revealed truth and for its relationship to truth as such. First, we 
will look at Grube’s rejection of the propositional character of revelation. Next, we will consider 
whether Tillich’s view of the independency of faith and knowledge – seen through Grube’s lenses 
– helps to avoid or solve conflicts with other forms of knowledge or whether it implies some sort 
of theory of double-truth. Finally, we will reflect on the historicity of the resurrection of Christ, 
to argue against Grube’s view that revealed truth does not describe reality but only steers the 
descriptions of reality on a metalevel. 
Faith, Knowledge and Propositional Truth 
Grube argues that for Tillich revelation does not offer new knowledge about the world, but 
pertains to the character of our knowledge. Revelation does not reveal facts, but offers a new 
perspective on the facts. Although revelation is not propositional it still is relevant for our 
knowledge.4 This raises the question whether revelation can be separated from its propositional 
content. In a certain sense, propositions, expressions that assert a truth, are almost indispensable 
to express one’s convictions. For example, Grube’s claim that revelation is erkenntnisrelevant is 
also a proposition, though, of course, he does not claim that it is revealed. 
2 I will mainly focus on chapter V of Grube’s book, titled ‘Glaube und Wissen bei Tillich: Die 
Offenbarungserkenntnis als Erkenntnis über die Erkenntnis statt Erkenntnis über die Welt’ in: Grube, Offenbarung, 
124-156. 
3 For Tillich and Grube revelation belongs to a ‘ganz andere Art’ of knowledge, which is situated on a different 
epistemological level. Grube concludes that the knowledge of revelation cannot be in real conflict with knowledge 
about the world, but only with knowledge about knowledge. Grube, Offenbarung, 124, 151. 
4 Grube, Offenbarung, 133. 
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Revelation is not identical with the Bible as a book. There are also other forms of revelation, 
sometimes called general or universal revelation. Moreover, the person and work of Jesus Christ 
is God’s revelation by excellence and the Christ-event is more comprehensive than the witness 
of the apostles, leave alone its possible expression in propositional statements. Still, the witness 
of prophets and apostles regarding the acts of the God of Israel and the Father of Jesus Christ – 
the only access we have to salvation history – can also be formulated in propositions. The shortest 
and most powerful confessional statement in the New Testament is ‘Jesus Kurios’. If we define 
a proposition as a sentence or expression that asserts a truth and can be either true or false, then 
this confession – just like most other confessional statements – is a proposition, even though it is 
more than just that. The Christian faith, summarized in the early confessions of the church, 
consists of confessional propositions, which Christians claim to be true. 
Of course, this aspect of revelation can be overemphasized. In the context of modernity, the 
orthodox Protestant view of the authority of Scripture was often phrased in the categories of 
propositional truths. Exemplary of this position is the Chicago Statement on Biblical 
Hermeneutics (1982): ‘We affirm that the Bible expresses God’s truth in propositional 
statements, and we declare that biblical truth is both objective and absolute’ (Article 6).5  This 
statement followed the previous Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (1978), that ‘Scripture 
is without error or fault in all its teaching.’6 Both statements reveal a modern understanding of 
biblical truth and were prompted by the rejection of historical-critical exegesis. The 
Chicagostatements nowadays are far less popular among evangelicals than they used to be. While 
modernity was characterized by rationality and the autonomy of the individual, postmodernity is 
highly relativistic.7 The switch from the modern to a so-called postmodern context offers new 
challenges and leads to new answers, also among evangelicals. 
This does not mean, however, that propositional truths should be completely rejected. 
According to Grube, revelation does not increase our  
5 Compare to, for example, Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals, ‘Articles of Affirmations and Denial’, Chicago 
Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, www.alliancenet.org/the-chicagostatement-on-biblical-hermeneutics, 
accessed 22 November 2019. 
6 Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals, ‘A Short Statement’, Article 4, Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, 
www.alliancenet.org/the-chicago-statement-on-biblical-inerrancy accessed 22 November 2019. 
7 On the challenges for the authority of Scripture in a postmodern context, see also H. van den Belt, ‘Scripture as 





NTT JOURNAL FOR THEOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
106 VOL. 74, NO. 2, 2020 
knowledge of nature or history and contains no information about facts, not even supernatural 
facts.8 Without propositions that formulate it, however, the confessional content of the Christian 
faith can hardly be expressed. As soon as you say ‘I believe (…)’ you imply that you believe 
something to be true, not only on a metalevel of knowledge about knowledge, but also on the 
factual level. Any answer to the question why you believe any aspect of the Christin faith to be 
true, will likely refer to some sort of revelation. 
Of course, much depends on the precise definitions of ‘propositional’ and of ‘revelation’. For 
the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional concepts of revelation, Grube refers 
to John Hick. In his Philosophy of Religion Hick argues that the propositional view of revelation 
dominates medieval theology and nowadays both Roman Catholicism and conservative 
Protestantism. ‘According to this view, the content of revelation is a body of truths expressed in 
statements or propositions. Revelation is the imparting to people of divinely authenticated 
truths.’9 
This intellectualistic picture of orthodox forms of Christianity, however, is a caricature. Views 
in which revelation is seen as exclusively or even mainly consisting of the imparting of 
propositions, would be very one-sided and are very rare. Orthodox Protestants acknowledge that 
faith based on revelation consists of more than the intellectual acceptance of truths. It also implies 
trust based on a relationship with the God who has revealed himself in Christ. Faith implies an 
existential relationship with God, experienced in genuine Christian spirituality and expressed in 
a radical Christian lifestyle. 
Grube argues from Hick’s distinction that a Christian concept of revelation must meet two 
conditions: 1) It cannot be a set of propositions concerning facts; but 2) still it must preserve its 
cognitive relevance, that is, it cannot be completely irrelevant to knowledge, for example, by 
being merely relevant in a moral sense.10 The simplest solution seems to be the 
acknowledgement that revelation – at least in some sense – does have a propositional character, 
although it is not exclusively propositional. Christians express their faith in confessional 
propositions in the firm conviction that they are true because they correspond to revealed truths. 
For them, their confession is not an invention based on opinion, but a proposition based on 
revelation. The claim that revelation is not propositional is an overstated  
8 Grube, Offenbarung, 140. 
9 J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, Englewood Cliffs 19904, 56. 
10 Grube, Offenbarung, 133. 
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reaction to the alleged claim of orthodoxy that all revelation is propositional. Grube’s view suffers 
from its dichotomic character. Because he only leaves two options: completely propositional or 
not propositional at all. He chooses for the latter option. Revealed truth does not describe reality 
but steers its descriptions from a metaperspective. 
Dualism 
For Grube faith and knowledge are independent and therefore knowledge based on revelation 
(Offenbarungserkenntnis) cannot conflict with ordinary knowledge.11 He follows Tillich, linking 
his position to the second model in Ian Barbour’s famous taxonomy. Religion and science are 
independent; both can be true as long as they are kept in separate domains.12 Tillich argues 
against the alternative model of conflict, because, as we have seen, knowledge gained through 
revelation does not add anything to our knowledge of nature and history, but is rather situated on 
a different epistemic level. 
I agree that revelation constitutes a new and comprehensive understanding of reality.13 I can 
also understand that this model of revelation is helpful in discussions regarding creation and 
evolution and I agree that the real conflict there lies between a scientistic or materialistic and a 
theistic worldview.14 If evolution turns into evolutionism it becomes an ideology that excludes 
faith in God as Creator. Moreover, faith in God the Father almighty, Maker of heaven and earth 
is a specific lens to look at the origin of the universe. It is a way of looking at things, rather than 
a conflicting set of scientific data. 
Still, faith in God as Creator can conflict with science, exactly because it also has a 
propositional content. The confessional phrase ‘in the beginning God created the heaven and the 
earth’ is more than a new perspective. It conveys knowledge about the world that is more than 
just knowledge  
11 Tillich, Systematic Theology, volume I, Chicago 1963, 156 [henceforth ST I-III]; compare to Grube, Offenbarung, 
128, n8. 
12 For a detailed discussion of the models, see I.G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary 
Issues, New York 1997, 77-105. 
13 Grube, Offenbarung, 142-143, n47. 
14 Grube, Offenbarung, 131. I agree with Alvin Plantinga that ‘there is superficial conflict but deep concord between 
science and theistic religion, but superficial concord and deep conflict between science and naturalism.’ A. 
Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism, Oxford 2011, ix. 
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about knowledge. Reflecting on how God made heaven and earth and us as human beings can 
cause tension with the way this process is reconstructed in the natural sciences, exactly because 
of that content. In the context of Medieval theology, the Aristotelian concept of an eternal world 
conflicted with the Christian notion that God created heaven and earth ‘in the beginning’. 
Generations of theologians have sought to overcome the implied tension between philosophical 
and revealed truth. 
In our modern and postmodern contexts, the fact that the universe has a beginning is less 
contested. The confessional proposition, however, that God by a specific act, created human 
beings in his likeness and image, conflicts with evolutionistic theories. The tension is soluble, but 
it exists exactly because the content of the biblical witness does not fit well in an evolutionary 
narrative of the origin of the species. To argue that there is no clash at all is an easy solution that 
does not satisfy the parties arguing about the relationship between faith and science. Indeed, the 
conflict is often caused or at least aggravated by a materialistic or naturalistic interpretation that 
excludes the possibility of divine intervention from the outset. But the claim that revelation never 
pertains to facts is a wrong answer to a naturalistic interpretation of the facts. 
It is too easy to solve the tension by interpreting revelation as a new perspective on reality. 
The clash is too strong for such an evasive reaction. Both outspoken atheists and convinced 
young-earth-creationists in their debates have a sense that something important is at stake. One 
does not have to agree with one of these parties to acknowledge that there is a clash because of 
the unity of truth. Both parties imply a certain coherence of the narrative of our origin based on 
the truths of the natural sciences and revealed truths. Both parties believe that these truths should 
be reconciled and that they can only be reconciled by denying one of them. Anyone who 
advocates a solution that will be potentially convincing should start with taking the clash serious. 
It will not help both parties to assert that there is no problem after all. 
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The Unity of the Truth 
This leads to the question whether Tillich’s view of revelation, as presented by Grube, leans 
towards a sort of double-truth theory. Under his thoughts on the independency of faith and 
knowledge and on the independency of revelation and historical reality lurks the danger of a split 
between revealed truth and historical truth. In his ethics Tillich rejects a split between theological 
truth and philosophical truth as ‘schizophrenic’, because independent theological ethics would 
lead to intolerable dualism.15 I agree with him there, but wonder why he advocates this dualism 
in his concept of revelation. 
In my oral response to Grube’s book I suggested that the main reason for Tillich and Grube to 
opt for the model that sees religion or faith and as independent entities lies in the desire to make 
revelation acceptable for the modern critical attitude that excludes the miraculous by eliminating 
the category of divine intervention from revelation, whereas traditionally that aspect of divine 
intervention – formerly called supernatural – is an essential condition of revelation. I also claimed 
that their proposal regarding the character of revelation can be boiled down to the popular phrase: 
‘It is true, but never happened’. A phrase that is characteristic of the way in which modern 
theology in general deals with anything miraculous in Scripture. Grube perhaps would formulate 
it more sophisticatedly: ‘It is true, because it sheds new light on what might have not even 
happened’. In other words, revelation hovers above history. 
In his reply, Grube answered that I pushed Tillich and him into the strict alternative of 
supernatural and natural, while it is their basic intention to overcome this alternative.16 At least, 
they do not oppose supernaturalism in the name of naturalism. Grube said that he plainly rejects 
the phrase ‘It is true but never happened’ as well my more sophisticated version, because in 
relativizing the historical he would not ascribe negative truth values to historical events. 
I wholeheartedly accept Grube’s correction. It is not helpful for a theological discussion to 
label one’s opinion in a way that he does not recognize himself. Still, there seems to be an 
uneasiness in liberal theology in general with acknowledging that God acts in the realms of time 
and space. 
Tillich and Grube deny that their position is dualistic because for them revelation is a lens 
through which reality is seen. They do not favour a split between revealed truth and historical 
truth, but locate them on two different epistemic levels. ‘Historical truth describes reality and is 
thus a first order epistemic phenomenon. Revealed truth, however, does not describe reality but 
steers the descriptions of reality. It is a second order or metaperspective. In German I call it an 
erkenntnisleitende Perspektive.’17 
15 Tillich, ST III, 267. 
16 D.-M. Grube, ‘Reply to Responses’ at the conference ‘Paul Tillich on Religion and Culture’ (Amsterdam, 4th of 
October 2019). 
17 Grube, ‘Reply to Responses’. 
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In my view revelation can only open a completely new perspective on reality, because it really 
changes that reality. Revelation indeed is more than historical, but it also pertains to historical 
facts, the mighty deeds of God in salvation history, such as the calling of Abraham, the exodus 
of Israel, the delivery from the Babylonian captivity, and the incarnation and resurrection of 
Christ. Locating revelation exclusively on a different epistemic level than knowledge in general 
might differ from locating theological and philosophical truths on the same epistemic level, but 
this does not repair the dualism between revealed truth and truth in general, it even makes the 
problem worse by denying that there can be any clash of truths, revelation does not describe 
reality, but only open new perspectives.18 
The Resurrection as a Paradigm Shift 
This leads to my third issue, which in a sense is the litmus test of our disagreement on the 
character of revelation: the historicity of the resurrection. In my view, what God has done in 
history – in the fulness of time – in the atoning death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, is revelation 
in its most pure form. Although it opens new perspectives it also pertains to historical facts. 
For Tillich and Grube revelation concentrates on the person and work of Jesus. The early 
Christian church learned to see Jesus of Nazareth from a new perspective, namely as the Christ. 
According to Grube, this new perspective is the most important aspect of the paradigm shift from 
Judaism to Christianity, a shift that includes the new understanding of time as an eschatological 
reality. 
Grube already developed his thoughts on this issue at length in previous publications. 
Paradigm shifts are triggered by anomalies, that lead to a change of the theoretical background 
which in turn provides a new perspective that allows one to perceive things differently. The 
legitimate origin of Christianity hinges on the anomaly that Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified, 
appeared to a number of people as being resurrected. This changed  
18 In the final conclusion of his chapter on faith and knowledge in Tillich’s theology, Grube acknowledges that there 
may be some indirect connections or points of contact between knowledge about the world and knowledge about 
knowledge that potentially question the fundamental independence between the two levels. Grube, ‘Reply to 
Responses’. Grube, Offenbarung, 153. 
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their ‘theoretical background knowledge’, and opened a new way of perceiving Jesus, namely as 
the promised Messiah.19 
It is not my purpose here to discuss the whole concept of Easter as a paradigm shift, which 
does have attractive elements.20 Instead I will concentrate on what it implies for the historicity 
of the Jesus’ resurrection. My main point is that an anomaly which is able to cause a paradigm 
shift must be rooted in facts. To use Grube’s example, in 1895 Wilhelm Röntgen per accident 
discovered that invisible cathode rays caused a fluorescent effect on a barium platinocyanide 
screen and thus discovered the X-rays. The experience of the fluorescent light led to a completely 
new paradigm. Under that paradigm, however, lay Röntgen’s valid conviction that his experience 
was based on the real existence of the hidden X-rays. An anomaly that causes a paradigm shift is 
always a real violation of scientific expectations. If an anomaly proves to be a mistake, then it 
will not be able to change the paradigm. 
Theology differs from the natural sciences in this respect, but still a paradigm shift that is able 
to legitimize the Christian faith must be based on more than the experience of appearances, 
without a real resurrection underlying them. The resurrection, just like any other deed of God in 
salvation history, has to be more than a historical fact, to be able to be effective. For Grube the 
resurrection, however, is less than historical. 
There is a slight development in Grube’s thought on this point. In his earlier publications 
Grube suggests that the paradigm shift presupposes that Jesus really rose from the dead. He 
argued against attempts to prove the historicity of the resurrection, but acknowledged that from 
the standpoint of Christian faith, the historicity of the resurrection itself may be more  
19 D.-M. Grube, ‘Reconstructing the Change from Judaism to Christianity as a Paradigm Shift’ in: B.E.J.H. Becking 
(ed.), Orthodoxy, Liberalism, and Adaptation: Essays on Ways of Worldmaking in Times of Change from Biblical, 
Historical and Systematic Perspectives, Leiden 2011, 225-247, 228, 239. In Grube’s book, titled Ostern als 
Paradigmenwechsel he explores this idea, devoting specific chapters to its consequences for Christology and for 
the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, in which he argues that the Christian paradigm does not annul 
the legitimacy of the existing Jewish paradigm. D.-M. Grube, Ostern als Paradigmenwechsel: Eine 
wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchung zur Entstehung des Christentums und deren Konsequenzen für die 
Christologie, Neukirchen 2012. 
20 Gijsbert van den Brink advocated a similar approach using the concept of a paradigm shift to argue for the 
compatibility of faith and science. See G. van den Brink, Een publieke zaak: Theologie tussen geloof en 
wetenschap, Zoetermeer 2004, 260-281; G. van den Brink, Philosophy of Science for Theologians, Frankfurt 2009, 
193-209. Compare to G. van den Brink, ‘Pasen als paradigmawisseling: Grube over het tegoed van Kuhn voor de 
christelijke theologie’, 815-821, 817. 
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urgent. Although he denied that ‘all-too-factualist’ interpretations, which pretend that 
Christianity hangs on the factuality of the resurrection, are essential, he did acknowledge ‘that 
the factuality of the resurrection cannot be marginalized. (…) Logically speaking, it is a necessary 
but by no means a sufficient condition for the emergence of that paradigm.’21 If it had been only 
a ghost of a dead person that appeared, there had been no anomaly.22 
In a response to Grube’s Ostern als Paradigmenwechsel Gijsbert van den Brink argued that if 
the explanation of the Easter event as a paradigm shift is correct, something must have happened 
at Easter not only in the minds of the disciples but also in reality by which the paradigm shift of 
the disciples was triggered. Grube replies that his view indeed implies that the resurrection is not 
so much important as a fact but in its function as an anomaly. The historical fact as such cannot 
explain the emergence of early Christianity, because it could have been interpreted in various 
ways, for instance as the appearance of a ghost. Grube’s presupposition, however, still was the 
historical resurrection of Christ.23 
Whereas he distanced himself from the progressive theologies of ‘the leftwing Bultmann-
school’ in his earlier publications, in his new book on Tillich, the emphasis is different. Instead 
of maintaining that the historical resurrection is an insufficient but nevertheless necessary 
condition of the paradigm shift, Grube now not only stresses that the new eschatological 
perspective relativizes the question regarding the historicity of the resurrection, as he had done 
before, but goes one step further in denying the relevance of the resurrection as a historical fact 
altogether. The resurrection only functions as a new eschatological frame of interpretation. The 
appearances of the resurrected Christ can be explained by the fact that God raised Jesus from the 
dead and thus vindicated him as the Messiah. This can be the case, but it is not necessarily so. 
Facts are multi-interpretable and the  
21 Grube, ‘Reconstructing the Change,’ 240 n26. 
22 Grube, Ostern als Paradigmenwechsel, 75-76. Compare to his remark that belief in the resurrection ‘is relevant for 
the Early Christians not so much as a historical event but, rather, as an anomaly that gives rise to the paradigm-
switch constituting the early church.’ D.-M. Grube, ‘The Resurrection of Jesus and the Foundationalism/Anti-
foundationalism Controversy’, in: T. Boer, H. Maat, A. Meesters, J. Muis (ed.), Van God gesproken: Over 
religieuze taal en relationele Theologie, 144-155, 155 n18. 
23 Responses of Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte, Rick Benjamins, Gijsbert van den Brink and Grube’s replies were 
published as ‘Pasen als paradigmawisseling (Easter as paradigm change)’ in: Stellenbosch Theological Journal 
(2015), 799-838. For the references see Van den Brink, ‘Pasen als paradigmawisseling’, 819; D.-M. Grube 
‘Antwoord op de responses van de collega’s’ in ‘Pasen als paradigmawisseling’, 822-838, 836. 
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appearances of Jesus could have been interpreted as the manifestation of a ghost, but then it would 
not have led to a paradigm shift.24 
The shift in emphasis is subtle, but first Grube asserted that the factual resurrection is an 
insufficient but necessary condition for the paradigm shift and that if it had been only a ghost 
there would have been no anomaly. Now he suggests that only the interpretation of the 
resurrection-experience as something else than the manifestation of a ghost is essential for the 
paradigm shift. Maybe this shift is partly due to the different discussion partners: ‘rightwing’ 
conservative Christians instead of ‘leftwing’ liberals. 
Still, in the present interpretation of Christ’s resurrection as paradigm shift, the historical 
foundation of Christianity, which was already relativized in Grube’s earlier publications, 
evaporates. At Easter nothing really happened, or had to happen, in a historical sense, because 
revelation does not add information to our knowledge. Easter merely offers a new perspective on 
reality. In the light of this development, it is a bit strange that he still asserts that the question of 
the historicity of the resurrection has not become irrelevant.25 The new element in his argument 
is that revelation – of which the resurrection is the example – takes place on a metalevel and 
Grube does not make clear why its historicity is still relevant. 
The Importance of a Historical Resurrection 
The main reason for Grube to relativize the question and leave its answer principally undecided 
is that if the historicity of the resurrection or even of the appearances could be proved, that would 
only substantiate a fact and underdetermine the revelatory event. Facts cannot legitimize the new 
eschatological perspective. 
My suggestion is to turn this argument around. Although the historical proof of the 
appearances cannot as such legitimize the new eschatological perspective, the fact that so many 
of the disciples – notwithstanding all the counter-evidence regarding its probability – accepted 
the resurrection of Christ as a new paradigm, is the most plausible legitimation of its historicity. 
According to Tom Wright, the question whether the resurrection was historical must be 
affirmed, although it has frequently been argued that the  
24 Grube, Offenbarung, 140-141. 
25 Grube, Offenbarung, 141. 
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resurrection is not accessible to historical investigation. He discusses the different meanings of 
the word ‘historical’ and the objections against the historical study of the resurrection, at length. 
He concludes that ‘the proposal that Jesus was bodily raised from the dead possesses unrivalled 
power to explain the historical data at the heart of early Christianity’.26 Although mathematical-
style proof is impossible, the historical resurrection of Christ provides the best explanation of the 
rise of early Christianity. 
In other words, the fact that the disciples’ experiences of encounters with the risen Christ led 
to a completely new perspective is the best argument for the historicity of the resurrection, 
because there is no other plausible way to explain the birth of Christianity save by the real and 
historical resurrection of Christ. 
Grube restricts revelation to the opening of the eyes after which the disciples saw everything 
in a new perspective, a new paradigm. In my view, however, his relativizing of the historicity of 
the resurrection undermines the argument that the paradigm shift legitimizes Christianity, 
because the paradigm shift can be only legitimized by a real anomaly. It is true that facts are 
multi-interpretable, but it is not true that a new perspective on reality can be triggered without 
facts. In other words, Grube is right in claiming that more than the historical resurrection is 
necessary, but wrong in suggesting that less than the historical resurrection is sufficient. 
The only plausible explanation of the experience of the appearances – and of the birth of 
Christianity in which they resulted – is the historical resurrection of Christ as an act of God, who 
vindicated the crucified Christ, as his Son, the truly righteous one. The letter of Paul to the 
Romans can be read as an explanation of Habakkuk 2:4 – ‘the Tsaddik will live by his 
faith(fulness)’ – as fulfilled in the resurrection of Christ. The resurrection of Christ is the 
revelation of his righteousness par excellence (Rom. 3:21). 
From the perspective of the Christian faith – call it a paradigm shift from second temple 
Judaism if you want – it is self-evident that the resurrection of Christ is much more than a 
historical fact, because it opens a new perspective on history. All who are united to Christ by 
faith participate in Him and in the new life of the age to come, although they still live in this 
present evil world (Gal. 1:4). The early Christian church did not only learn to see Jesus from a 
new perspective as the Christ, but they saw him as the one who had risen – in history and on this 
earth – from the empty grave. 
26 N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, London 2012, 718. 
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In principle, I agree with Grube that it is not necessary to prove or to be able to prove the 
historicity of the resurrection. This does not mean, however, that God’s revelation through this 
act can be disconnected from its historical origin. Grube again suggests only two options: either 
the historicity of the resurrection can be proved as a foundational basis of the Christian faith, or 
its historicity is irrelevant. But the historical reality of something that perhaps cannot be proved 
on the basis of historical research, still, may be very relevant for other reasons. In this case, 
because what God has done in the life, death and resurrection of Christ is a necessary historical 
basis of Christianity. Again, Grube’s view suffers from its dichotomic character. 
As an act of God, it can indeed not be proved since no historical fact can be proved to be a 
divine intervention by historical means. Facts, even the real resurrection of a body, are always 
open to alternative explanations. The confessional understanding of the resurrection of Christ as 
a divine act, however, does presuppose its historical reality. The experience of the disciples of 
the appearances of the risen Christ does not suffice if we leave the option open that it was merely 
a psychological effect. Attempts to prove the historicity of the resurrection need not and should 
not function as a foundation of the Christian faith, but there is no reason, given the historicity of 
the resurrection to reject them wholesale.27 
Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that revelation cannot be restricted to an epistemological metalevel 
without conveying some propositional content. The early confessions of the church consist of 
confessional propositions, which Christians claim to be true. Revelation is more than 
propositional, but not less than propositional or on a completely different level from it. I have 
also argued that knowledge based on revelation can and indeed does sometimes conflict with 
other forms of knowledge. Grube denies the possibility of a conflict between knowledge from 
natural sciences and revealed knowledge by placing the latter on a metalevel. The real conflict 
lies between revelation and certain forms of naturalism or materialism.28 
27 Grube refers to W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, Gütersloh 1964, 85103 and R.  
Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate, Oxford 2003. 
28 Grube, Offenbarung, 133. 
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I agree with that analysis, not because revelation is exclusively situated on a metalevel, but 
because these forms of naturalism and materialism are part of alternative worldviews or 
ideologies that combat with Christianity, by interpreting the facts from a different framework. 
My main objection against Grube’s position is his conclusion from the fact that the resurrection 
cannot be proved to the claim that its historicity is irrelevant: ‘If the historicity of the resurrection, 
or rather of the appearances, could be proved, it would only substantiate a mere fact. (…) It cannot 
make it plausible why the first Christian churches have taken a new leading perspective on the 
interpretation of reality, nor can it show that this change of perspective was legitimate.’29 
Over against docetism the first Christians not only confessed that Christ was crucified under 
Pontius Pilate, but also that he rose from the dead under Pontius Pilate.30 The main reason that 
the name of this cruel prelate is mentioned in the Apostle’s Creed is to affirm the historical basis 
of the Christian faith. 
Faith itself is impossible without illumination – and that is how I would call the metalevel on 
which revelation steers all our other knowledge – but this illumination presupposes the prior and 
historical revelation of God in Christ. Illumination does not add new propositional information 
to revealed truth, but it presupposes the revelation of God’s deeds in salvation history. These 
deeds can be formulated in confessional propositional statements. It is not arbitrary whether 
Christ rose again in the minds of the disappointed disciples – who had to cope psychologically 
with the loss of their Master – or in historical reality. Easter turns the entire course of history only 
because it is a historical event, although it is much more than that. 
29 Grube, Offenbarung, 141-142, Compare to ‘(…) my point is that making the reasonableness of the Christian belief 
system dependent upon the success of demonstrating the historicity, likelihood, probability or whatever of the 
belief in resurrection is unnecessary restrictive’, in: Grube, ‘Resurrection of Jesus’, 151. 
30 Ignatius, To the Magnesians, 11, in: B.D. Ehrman (ed.), The Apostolic Fathers, Volume I: I Clement. II Clement. 
Ignatius. Polycarp. Didache (Loeb Classical Library 24), Cambridge 2003, 252-253. For the importance of 
resurrection over against Docetism, see also Ignatus, To the Trallians, 9, in: Ehrman, Apostolic Fathers, 264-265. 
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